Flexibility. What is it? How do you generate it? And what happens when you don't? We look at the Malaya campaign for the answers. This is episode 11 of the Principles Of War podcast, looking at how the Allies and the Japanese applied the principle of flexibility in the Malaya campaign. This is one of the principles that I think is really important when it comes to Malaya, because it was something that the Japanese did inherently well. They really played to their strengths when it came to flexibility, and we want to look at how that manifested itself at a tactical level. It was also something that the Allies didn't do well on the whole, and they paid the price for it. So what is flexibility?
Doctrinally, it is the capacity to adapt plans, to take account for unforeseen circumstances, to ensure success in the face of friction and unexpected resistance or setbacks, or to capitalise on unexpected opportunities. It relates to the ability to maintain effectiveness across a range of tasks, situations and conditions, the ability to dynamically manage the balance and weight of effort across different lines of operation in space and time, and the ability to rapidly identify, then appropriately respond to new threats and opportunities. That definition almost is the exact opposite of what the Allies were able to do. Now, uncertainty is part of the enduring nature of war. So there's a few things in there out of LWD3 uncertainty that is, by its nature, complexity generates uncertainty. Forces need to retain flexibility and have inherent resilience to adapt to the unexpected.
So once you've come up with your plan, you've generated your set of orders that's got to be promulgated out to all of the troops. You've then got them carrying them out flawlessly. You've got the interactions between all of the moving parts involved in your operation. You've then got the environment, troops getting lost, all of the vagaries of war that lead to that friction. And then lastly, you've got to remember that the enemy gets a vote. So this is a significant part of the uncertainty. What is it that the enemy's going to do? So how does that manifest itself in the offence? Well, one of the tools that you've got is the concept of recon pool. So recon pull is the identification and exploitation of fleeting opportunities of the enemy's weaknesses when they occur.
As forces will seldom operate with a comprehensive knowledge of the enemy or their environment, there'll be a need to continually exploit enemy weaknesses, which are either physical or psychological as they appear. Successful recon pool requires mission command and forces that are adaptable and able to maintain their freedom of action. On land, the Force will be required to fight for and not necessarily with information. As a result, during the conduct of operations, force responses will be characterised by the adaption cycle, act, sense, decide and adapt. So what about on the defence? Well, flexibility is one of the characteristics of defensive tasks. So defensive operations require flexibility. Planning focuses on preparation in depth, use of reserves and the ability to shift the main effort of the defensive scheme. Commanders add flexibility by designating supplementary positions and preparing multiple counter attack options.
So with the Japanese, obviously on the offence, the number one capability that gave them flexibility was the ability to conduct amphibious manoeuvre from the sea. And this is really interesting because when you think about it, the Japanese are a seagoing people. It's an archipelago with 6,852 islands. So a very strong tradition, capability, experience in operating between islands, conducting naval operations. And so the development of an amphibious capability played to that strength. And in fact they'd been doing this for quite a while. The invasions of Malaya, the Philippines, Wake Island, Hong Kong in December 1941, that wasn't their first hit out of the park. They'd been doing this for quite a while. So In World War I, the Japanese were on the Allied side, probably moderately opportunistically because they were able to attack German colonial territories.
So in 1914 the Japanese conducted amphibious operations to seize the German port of Tsingtao. Now, from an operational point of view, the key terrain, maybe even the decisive terrain, was obviously the Tsingtao brewery, which was founded in 1903 and is now the second largest brewery in China. So the operations in Tsingtao saw the seaplane carrier Wakamiya conduct the world's first land attack from sea, also the first bombing of sea targets from naval launched aircraft, and as well as that, the first nighttime bombing raid. So they are three firsts that the Japanese have managed to carry out. And you've got to remember this is in 1914. So despite the fact that they'd been developing these capabilities since 1914, the Allies for some reason were unable to appreciate the threat of the capability that the Japanese were developing.
Now during the interwar years, or should I say during our interwar years between World War I and World War II, because these weren't interwar years for the Japanese, they had ongoing hostilities with the Chinese, multiple landings. They were able to seize a lot of the ports in China with amphibious raids. There was ongoing development of their amphibious doctrine and there was also significant effort made into the development of landing craft and ships to support amphibious operations. Now we talked about the issues between with inter service rivalry that the Allies faced. When we looked at cooperation and we've alluded to the fact that there were significant issues within the Japanese hierarchy as well. Now, a great example of this is the Shanghai incident. So in 1937 the Navy was significantly concerned about the capability that army was developing as they were invading Manchuria.
So they decided to conduct an amphibious assault onto into Shanghai. They landed some naval troops. It did not go well. They were landed with insufficient ammunition, insufficient troops and insufficient heavy equipment. And after six weeks it required the very embarrassing request for aid to the army. The interesting fact that comes out of this is that they were then able to land 70,000 troops to stabilise the situation. Now, this was quite embarrassing for the Navy and it highlighted significant issues between army and Navy cooperation. But I think we really do need to underline the fact that they were able to put together an operation to land 70,000 soldiers to rescue the Navy. That is a not insignificant operation to conduct, especially when it is done at short notice. That really highlights the kind of capability that the Japanese have got.
And Remember, this is 1937, so there is still four more years of operational experience that they're going to be gaining before they invade Malaya. Now, this one example gives us a couple of things to think about from a flexibility point of view. Not only have they the flexibility to choose the location of the landing for their amphibious manoeuvre from the sea, but also they have the flexibility to conduct a short notice operation to land 70,000 troops. That is a not insignificant capability to be able to bring to the table now that we get to Malaya. The invasion was conducted with three simultaneous landings. So one at Singora, one at Patani, both of these were in Thailand.
And one at Kota Bahru, which is on the eastern coast right at the north of Malaya, where the RAF had been kind enough to place an air base very close to the coast. Defending Kota Bharu was the 8th Indian Infantry Brigade commanded by Brigadier Key from the 9th Infantry Division. And this was one of the few areas in Malaya where some defensive works had actually been done. So there were pillboxes that had been created, there were obstacles on the beach and it had also been mined. And there was barbed wire as well. And he even had a battery of guns in support. The big issue that he had was there was very little depth to the position. So each rifle company was holding around five kilometres of terrain, which is clearly inadequate.
And remember when were talking about the considerations for the defence and where flexibility comes into it, one of the ways of generating that, of course, is the reserve. And he only had a small reserve. The defence actually started out quite well. The first and second waves took heavy casualties and number one squadron RAAF flying Lockheed Hudson bombers, was able to attack the transports. All three of the Japanese troop ships were significantly damaged and one was actually sunk. But the Japanese were gradually able to push the defenders off the beach. The counter attack failed and a withdrawal was organized. So the commencement of hostilities sees a very clear demonstration of the capabilities that the Japanese have, being able to mount three independent landings, one of which is opposed, all of which are successful into the ao.
And this operational maneuver from the sea capability is something that they will use time and time again to give them the flexibility that they need, especially considering that they are fighting outnumbered. One of the best examples of the flexibility that operational manoeuvre from the sea gives the Japanese is in the battle of Kampah. So Kampah occurs after the battle of Jitra, after Aloo Star Falls, after Penang falls. And one of the interesting things at Penang is that the locals hide a lot of the boats there, which means that about 60 boats fall into the hands of the Japanese, giving them once again augmenting their amphibious capability. And we see another great example of the Japanese approach to sustainment. It's a lot easier to procure something when you procure it from your enemy.
So the battle starts December 30, 1941, and it is Yamashita's intent to give Kampar, or the capture of Kampar, to the Emperor as a present for the New Year. So he is expecting this to go quite quickly as a lot of the previous engagements have occurred. Probing and encircling starts on 30 December, which is the typical Japanese tactic. On the 31st, there is a significant attack on the 11th Indian Division's position. This goes in on the 28th Gurkha Brigades, but they are well dug in and well supported with artillery fire, so they are able to beat off the Japanese. And in one of those nice touches that I think is great for morale, the CO of the 155th Field Regiment, Lieutenant Colonel Augustus Murdoch. @ midnight on New Year's Eve, he orders a 12 gun salute to be fired at the Japanese.
Now, on the next morning, the 1st of January 1942, the 41st Regiment launches an assault on the British Battalion. The British Battalion was actually an Amalgamated Battalion from 2nd Battalion, East Surrey Regiment and the 1st Battalion, the Leicester Regiment. And both battalions had suffered such heavy casualties in the battle of Jitra and The COS of one of the battalions was badly wounded at Jitra, so it was decided to form an amalgamated battalion of the remnants of the two battalions. The fighting was very fierce, with terrain changing hands multiple times, often at the point of the bayonet. And the fighting is so fierce that one of the platoons of the British battalion commanded by Lieutenant Edgar Newland is actually surrounded and cut off. And he holds on for two days now. He later receives the Military Cross for his. For his exploits in this action.
But it's a very interesting contrast with the way that a lot of the defense has been conducted, whereby a unit has been surrounded and then surrendered. And I think some of that comes down to the fact that this young lieutenant has obviously provided some excellent leadership with the hope that at some point there will be a counter attack to restore the position. And this is one of those things that's really important for morale. He had that trust that the others in his battalion and brigade were going to try and rescue their position. That was something that wasn't obvious in a lot of the other situations that the British found that the Allies found themselves in so significant fighting here, one where the Allies actually stay in place and offer up significant resistance. The Japanese try a filleting attack and that doesn't go well.
So they then fall back to find the flank of the Allied defensive position. They're unable to do that. The terrain isn't conducive to it. There's good coordination between the infantry and the artillery for a change, and often they are. The terrain isn't conducive to flanking manoeuvres, so at a tactical level, the flanking maneuver isn't able to work. So what Yamashita decides to do is to outflank the defensive position at an operational level. And he does this with operational manoeuvre. From the sea, he is able to conduct a landing at Telok Anson, and that is to the rear of the Kampar position. It threatens the withdrawal route. And Brigadier Paris has no alternative but to order the withdrawal from the Campah defensive position. Now, Brigadier Paris, quite an interesting officer.
He was the Commander of the 12th Indian Infantry Brigade, and he was given the job of covering the retreat of the 11th Indian Division from Jitra. Did a really good job of that. Took the Japanese by surprise. And he was actually given command of 11th Indian Division after Percival sacked Major General David Murray Lyon after taking command of the Indian 11th Infantry Division. He wanted to restore the confidence of the division. And in Brian Farrell's book, he talks about how Paris wanted to conduct an offensive withdrawal with a sting in the tail. And Paris wanted the Japanese to start feeling the stress that they'd been feeling. He wanted the Japanese to be sniped at, shot up and attacked with armored cars and the Tiger patrols. And he issued a call to arms to the division.
He said, the present situation has got to cease and the Japanese have got to become frightened of us. I decline to believe that British and Indian troops are incapable of bringing about this desirable state of affairs. It is up to us to establish local and personal ascendancy over the enemy immediately opposed to us. Now this divisional call to arms actually worked. The morale of the troops increased. It became really high, particularly once combat was joined and they could see that they were holding their position. One of the troops wrote, a welcome feeling of exhilaration elevated me as we held our ground against the stubborn Japanese advances. The words of patriotic songs flowed through my mind. Britons never, never shall be slaves.
These words accompanied the incessant roar of our howitzers as they blasted the life from the Japanese and they let them know who were the masters. Morale was now so high that I actually expected that we might perhaps push forward. And I was not alone in that thought. Our morale had taken another dent from the order to withdrawal. We had retreated again, just as we'd begun to believe that the tide was turning in our favour. So he's talking about that order to withdraw. And I think that quote from one of the soldiers really does illustrate the importance of flexibility. The tide was turning. So a new divisional commander has strengthened the backbone of the division. They've offered up a really stout defence to the Japanese. They'd started to call out the Japanese for ignoring some of the principles of war.
They were travelling too quickly, too light. They weren't sustaining themselves. This was creating significant problems for them. The Indian 11th Infantry Division was able to fight on ground of its choosing and it was able to fight the kind of fight that it had trained for, well supported with artillery from a defensive position. This masked the issues in command and control that the British system had. The fact that they were in a static defensive position meant that there was less requirement to think on your feet and make decisions quickly, which was something that the British didn't do well, and they were able to make the Japanese pay the penalty for that. But Yamashita had a card up his sleeve.
He had the ability to conduct operational manoeuvre from the sea and that was able to physically dislocate the division out of its defensive position, which dented their morale again, and they were able to do this on multiple occasions. This gave them the flexibility that they required as they conducted the events down Malaya. And once again, interesting to note, Yamashita's landing at Teluk Anson was done with craft that he'd taken from Penang, a small force large enough, though, to be able to threaten the withdrawal routes. Now, flexibility in general was something that the Allies really struggled to be able to demonstrate. Why was that? I think that there is a couple of things that really create this problem for them. Firstly, the morale was low. We haven't talked about morale, but that's coming up.
Morale was not great and it continued to deteriorate as the operational situation deteriorated. Some of the units were poorly trained. Some of them were actually quite fresh. The Indian units were part of the scaling up of the army in response from the call from Britain out to the Empire for troops. So a lot of these soldiers hadn't been in the army for a long time. There were issues with leadership. Some of the units weren't well led. But I think probably the most important factor in the lack of flexibility in the Allied defence in Malaya comes down to a lack of mission command. Now, I would argue that mission command is probably less important on the defence than it is in the offence. The Japanese definitely practiced it. Lt. Col.
Tsuji, the operations officer within Yamashita's headquarters, would often alter orders to maintain the tempo of the assault without reference to Yamashita, because there wasn't time to get his ascension to the. To the change in orders. This was the fundamental part of it, maintaining that operational tempo. This is where mission command is really important, and it was practiced at quite a low level within the Japanese Army. For the British, though, it wasn't. Now, there were exceptions to this, and I come back to Lieutenant Colonel Stewart of the 2nd Battalion, Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders. We talked about him being labeled a crank. When I first read that, I thought that it was because he was out training his men while the other officers were back in the mess drinking Singapore slings and gin and tonics in the afternoon because it was frightfully hot.
While they were doing that, he was out training his troops in the jungle in the mud. And I thought, you know, it was making the other officers feel bad, that they kind of thought that they probably needed to be out exercising the troops. But it wasn't that. It wasn't the fact that he was training the troops, it was the way that he was training his troops. And he understood that fighting in the jungle was going to require a Fundamentally different way of thinking. Communication was very difficult. The situation was very fluid. It could change dramatically very quickly because of the fact that the enemy could only be observed out to 10 or 20 meters, so no one was going to have a good picture of what was happening on the battlefield.
This requires you to empower your subordinates to make the decision on the field. So let's have a quick look at mission command from Doctrine. Mission command is the practice of assigning a subordinate commander a mission without specifying how the mission is to be achieved. Through this process, a commander grants his subordinate the freedom and duty to accomplish the mission. Effective Mission command encourages initiative with the added benefit of allowing commanders to focus on higher level concerns rather than subordinate mission execution. The effective practice of mission command is essential to deal successfully with the chance, friction and uncertainty of conflict. Mission command allows faster, more relevant decision making in complex volatile environments, but also relies more heavily on individual judgment and tactical exertion.
It is based on the clear expression of the senior commander's intent and the granting of trust and freedom to subordinates to act creatively within that intent. Mission command must be endorsed and practiced at all levels in order to be effective. This requires implicit trust between and across all elements of the land force, with junior leaders possessing a detailed understanding not only of the immediate tactical commander's intent, but also of the broader operational and strategic situation. The subordinate is then expected to apply individual judgment in achieving the commander's intent. Regardless of the changing situations. Junior leaders are also expected to seek opportunities to immediately pursue their commander's intent. Once tasked and resourced, army must actively create the climate and foster behaviour that produces a mission command culture. Now, there's a couple of things in here that I think are really relevant to the Malaya campaign.
Faster decision making that would have been really handy because a lot of the time commanders were making decisions and in the process that it took to make that decision, the situation had changed so that their decision was now irrelevant. Once again, we go back to the first podcast in this series on Malaya where we talk about a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope. This wide OODA loop is created with a command and control structure that requires commanders to refer back to hire when the situation changes. In a situation where you don't have good communications, this can dramatically increase the amount of time to create for decision making to occur. Not only that, but it's also inherently more dangerous. Lt. Col. Robertson, the CEO of the 2nd 29th Battalion, he is killed trying to get back to higher headquarters.
He's riding pillion passenger on a motorbike, trying to get back to briefhead what is going on and to seek guidance what he should do. He paid for that with his life. It talks about trust between commanders. This was something that was fundamentally lacking at the divisional level. Bennett was very dismissive of the other divisional commanders. He didn't believe in their ability to actually fight the Japanese. He didn't believe that they were capable of mounting an effective defense. He didn't trust them at all. And within 8th Division itself, he was very prescriptive in the kind of orders that he would give and the way that subunits would be commanded. And Brigadier Taylor, the commander of 22nd Brigade, he said that when he was trying to conduct training activities, Bennett would attend the activities.
And he said he quite felt that Bennett would like to command the brigade himself. So a lot of micromanagement. The defence of Kampar went well for the Allies because it was a prepared defensive position. Morale was relatively high and it got higher as they could see that they were able to beat off the Japanese advances and there was effective communication and coordination between the infantry and the artillery. The artillery really did punish the Japanese when they showed themselves. This was the kind of battle that the Allies wanted to fight and were able to fight given the right conditions. But at the first instant that the Japanese were able to put them under some pressure and create a situation for which they hadn't planned, it started to crumble.
The Japanese, on the other hand, faced with a defensive position that they couldn't fill it, faced with a defensive position that they couldn't outflank, moved to outflanking at an operational level. Operational manoeuvre from the sea, an amphibious landing that physically dislocates the Indian 11th Infantry Division out of its position. Now, of all of the officers who escaped out of Singapore, Lieutenant Colonel Stuart was probably the most experienced in fighting the Japanese. And Field Marshal Wavell wrote, if all the units in Malaya had been led with the same foresight and imagination that Brigadier Stuart showed in the training of his battalion, the story of the campaign might have been different. It was the realisation of this that led me to order Brigadier Stuart's return to India to impart his knowledge and ideas to units preparing for the return match with the Japanese.
Wavell saw that the British army needed to change the way that it was doing things if it was to defeat the Japanese. And Stuart's briefing to Wavell notwithstanding, he saw that he had the tactics to be able to bring about that change. So that's it for flexibility. I hope that looking at the Battle of Kampar, which was one of the successes for the Allies, we've been able to look at why it was a success and what the conditions were for it to be successful. And because those conditions were so infrequent, that was one of that was the big reason why the Allied victories were so infrequent. The Japanese were just a lot more flexible during the campaign. Next up, we're going to look at morale.
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