The Korean War Week 004 - Americans Repeatedly Routed - July 16, 1950

Although, other than Koreans, the only ground troops fighting this war so far are Americans,
The United Nations expects there to be more from its member states,
and this week they officially choose the man to run UN Command, Douglas MacArthur.
I’n Indy Neidell, and this is the Korean War.
Last week saw the first action between American ground forces- Task Force Smith- and KPA,
North Korean, forces. Lacking both equipment and training, the Americans were badly routed. After
that, other units of US 24th Division faced the KPA and were also soundly beaten. The ROK,
the South Koreans, are reorganizing, though, and their army had nearly 70,000 men, and though the
KPA advanced all week across the country, in many places they began taking heavy casualties.
Of course, they are still advancing all over this week.
Now, the 21st regiment, from US 24th division, fully arrived at Taejon last week the 7th.
Divisional Commander William Dean sent them north, under their commander Colonel Richard Stephens,
to delay the enemy at Chochiwon, support the 34th Regiment, and keep the supply route to 34th open.
However, “At Chochiwon all was confusion. There were no train schedules or train manifests.
Supplies for the 24th Division and for the ROK 1st Corps eastward at Chungju arrived all mixed
together. The South Korean locomotive engineers were hard to manage. At the least alarm they
were apt to bolt south with trains still unloaded, carrying away the supplies and ammunition they had
just brought up to the front. American officers had to place guards aboard each locomotive.”
Dean’s orders went out late on the 8th for 24th Division to withdraw to positions along the south
bank of the Kum River, 15 km south of Chochiwon while delaying the enemy. The orders say,
“Hold Kum River Line at all costs. Maximum, repeat, maximum delay will be effected.” So
now 21st infantry is to hold back the enemy in front of Chochiwon and 34th along the road to
the river. 21st has a battery of howitzers and a company of M24 light tanks with them,
and engineers ready all the Kum River bridges for demolition. The plan is delay and delay,
and then make a stand at the river, deciding the fate of Taejon perhaps there.
“If Major General William F. Dean, the commander of the 24th Division, imagined that the fiascos
at Pyongtaek and Chonan were the low water mark of his campaign he was wrong. The town
of Taejon contained his divisional headquarters and supply dumps, well stocked with fuel, rations,
and ammunition. He intended to make a stand in front of this important communications center.”
On the 9th at the end of last week the enemy engaged the forward American positions at
Chonui. American air strikes were called in, directed by tactical air control parties,
and five of 11 arriving enemy tanks were on fire by late afternoon, and by the evening,
roughly half of the 200 or so vehicles on the road down from Pyongtaek were burning.
On the 10th as this week begins, though, the land is covered by morning fog,
which the KPA uses to infiltrate both men and tanks around and behind the American
positions. When the fog clears they advance, and while air strikes delay that advance,
once they’re finished the advance continues, overrunning the American left where most of
the men die in their foxholes. Stephens orders retreat at 1205, though much of
his right flank has already pulled back by then. He’s lost about 20% of his total force.