Why Stalin Turned to Hitler - Eastern Front Week-by-Week Prelude #8

by Panzer
The infamous Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was not signed in a vacuum. Like all treaties,
it was negotiated and agreed to in a whirlwind of competing interests as the countries of
Europe tried to figure out a way to prevent a world war. Hitler was determined to wage his
wars of aggression, but he wanted to limit opposition. We left off last week with a
look at Stalin’s purges and early Soviet intervention in the Far East. This week,
we will continue with the eighth video in our prelude to the Kings and Generals Weekly
Eastern Front Series. Welcome to our video evaluating the relations between the Soviet
Union and Germany in the final days of peace before the first shots of the second world war.
The Soviet Union had been nervous about potential German revanchism since the very earliest days of
the civil war. This was only aggravated when Hitler came to prominence and then power in
the earliest days of the nineteen thirties. Stalin had made it clear that the Soviets
would work to combat the diplomatic isolation of the country, especially with France and the
United Kingdom. These countries had been erstwhile allies in the first world war.
Stalin pressured them to see the reality of the new European security situation with Hitler in
control of Germany. He wanted the Triple Entente revived and worked to get Britain and France to
come to the table for negotiations on the matter. By nineteen thirty-five it was clear to all in the
Soviet Union that multilateral treaties would be the only way to properly deter Hitler’s
expansionism. The Soviet Foreign Minister, Maxim Litvinov, worked feverishly to bring France into
a mutual defense pact. Doing so proved to be a difficult task. This was exacerbated by political
opportunists in France who viewed the negotiations as a chance to denounce the Soviets as the real
threat to peace in Europe. Eventually, the treaty was signed and ratified by nineteen thirty-six.
However, it was far from the ironclad guarantee of mutual assistance that had been sought in the
beginning. The treaty had been watered down by the less-than-enthusiastic French. They had ensured
that obligations to the Soviet Union would not become mandatory until after the League of Nations
had become formally involved and the other powers of the Treaty of Locarno had been consulted. It
was, in effect, a hollow promise of help. This did not deter the Soviets. They worked
to sign another mutual defense pact, this time with Czechoslovakia. The pact went through but was
ultimately undermined when France and the United Kingdom pushed Czechoslovakia to accept the German
terms. This acceptance meant that the Soviets had no grounds for intervention to save the country,
even if there had been real willpower on the part of Stalin to do so. The Soviet Union made
statements that they were prepared to help the central European country resist, but it was clear
that there was no path to do so. The tyranny of geography meant that without Polish acquiescence,
no Soviet troops could reach Czechoslovakia. The Poles resisted pressure to give this permission.
They had legitimate fears about the Soviet Union’s intentions regarding Polish territory. It is
unclear if the Soviets had any ill intentions at this point. The eventual desire to take Polish
territory in part and to merge the country into the Soviet political orbit entirely was
clear from the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact made in nineteen thirty-nine, but we will discuss that
later. Polish resistance to allowing Soviet forces to pass through its territory sealed
the fate of Czechoslovakia. It would prove to be a critical failing in the negotiations to bring